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Abstract
While populism and technocracy have attracted enormous scientific attention in recent years, surprisingly how the two
concepts relate to each other has rarely been investigated. Looking at the case of the EU, we investigate how populist
parties position themselves in relation to technocracy in general and the technocratic nature of EU institutions in partic-
ular. In a first theoretical step, we identify the core elements, modes of governance, and policy output of technocratic
governance and use them to derive potential responses of populist parties. In the empirical part, we investigate these
aspects of technocracy by applying quantitative and qualitative approaches using the 2019 European election manifestos
of 12 populist parties. We show that left- and right-wing populist parties articulate anti-technocratic positions, particularly
regarding the core elements of technocratic governance. The concrete technocratic critique differs regarding the respec-
tive host ideology. However, within the group of hybrid populist parties, ANO 2011 and GERB appear not to have a critical
stance towards technocracy and thus can be classified as technocratic populist parties.
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1. Introduction
It is not the French and their Marine Le Pen, not the
Austrians and their Heinz-Christian Strache, not the
Hungarians and their Viktor Orbán, and it is not us
Germans from the AfD who are driving Europe against
the wall, but it is these Brussels technocrats who do
it and it is to these people that we are declaring
war. (Jörg Meuthen, top candidate of the AfD for the
European elections 2019 at the AfD European elec-
tion campaign kick-off on 06 April 2019 in Offenburg;
AfD, 2019a)
After 20 years of experience with governance by our
political parties, I do not much trust the flowery
claims. What I believe in…is that a state can be run
like a private company, not like a chaotic juggernaut,
where the godfather’s right-hand does not know what
the left one is doing. (Andrej Babiš of ANO 2011 in
2013, as cited in Havlík, 2019)
With the rise of both populism and technocratic gover-
nance in recent years, there has been extensive research
on these two phenomena (e.g., Caramani, 2017; Mair,
2013; Mudde, 2004). Since both are perceived as symp-
toms of a broader crisis of democratic legitimacy and
as types of ‘democratic disfiguration’ (Urbinati, 2014),
the literature has focused on the commonalities and
differences in their relation to representative democra-
cy (e.g., Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2017; Caramani,
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2017). However, hardly any research has explored how
the two phenomena relate to each other. It is argued,
that adopting a unidirectional perspective helps to bet-
ter understand the specific relations between them as
well as the phenomena themselves. We aim to do this by
exploring the responses of populist parties to technocrat-
ic governance. The above-quoted statements of the two
populist parties AfD and ANO 2011 point to different per-
ceptions of technocracy: While Jörg Meuthen from the
German right-wing populist party AfD is ‘declaring war’
to the Brussels technocrats, Andrej Babiš from ANO 2011
promises to ‘run the state as a firm’ and promotes tech-
nocracy and efficiency as the main solution for politics
(Buštíková & Guasti, 2019; Havlík, 2019). This raises ques-
tions about varieties of populist responses to technocrat-
ic governance and whether there are distinct responses
depending on the type of populism. To investigate this
empirically, the EU provides an ideal case since its tech-
nocratic nature is regularly and harshly criticized, it has
also been noted by Habermas that the EU is in “the lure
of technocracy” (Habermas, 2015, p. 3; see also Pirro,
Taggart, & van Kessel, 2018; Radaelli, 1999). Therefore,
the central research question is: How do populist parties
respond to technocracy and, in particular, to the techno-
cratic nature of EU institutions and governance?
A comparative framework is proposed to analyze
whether and how the populist core and the host ide-
ology of populist parties influence the positions of the
populist parties to technocracy. Therefore, we investi-
gate populist parties’ responses towards the techno-
cratic nature of the EU through a comparison of dif-
ferent types of populist parties (right-wing, left-wing,
hybrid [including technocratic]) based on the party man-
ifestos for the European elections 2019. In the follow-
ing, based on the central concepts, the conceptual frame-
work and the hypotheses are developed. The third sec-
tion presents data and methods, followed by the analysis
and the conclusions.
2. Theoretical Framework: Connecting Populism
and Technocracy
Despite being a contested concept, the sharp contrast-
ing of the ‘pure people’ and the elite is the core char-
acteristic of almost all definitions of populism (Mudde,
2004; Roberts, 1995). Instead of a corrupt elite, poli-
tics should be an expression of the volonté générale
of the people and needs to directly communicate with
the people (Urbinati, 2014, p. 132; see also Albertazzi &
McDonnell, 2008; Rooduijn, 2013). Given its nature as
a ‘thin-centred ideology,’ populism “can be easily com-
bined with very different (thin and full) other ideologies”
(Mudde, 2004, p. 544; see also Heinisch & Mazzoleni,
2017; Taggart, 2004). Therefore, populist parties are not
only characterized by their populist element but also by
their host ideology. Thus, different forms have been dis-
tinguished: as well as right-wing and left-wing populism,
a third cluster is characterized by a fuzziness on the left-
right spectrum and has been defined as hybrid (Bickerton
& Invernizzi Accetti, 2018), centrist (Ivaldi, 2020; Stanley,
2017), or valence populism (Zulianello, 2020). Recently,
technocratic populism has been discussed as a distinct
form of valence populism. Since it uses “the appeal of
technical expertise to connect directly with the people”
(Buštíková & Guasti, 2019, p. 302; see also Havlík, 2019),
it is of particular interest for the focus of this article.
The technocratic conception of politics suggests that
political decisions are taken by unelected experts, rather
than by traditional elected representatives. A transfer
of authority to expertocratic institutions is believed to
ensure that decisions are rational, depoliticized, and
impartial (Caramani, 2017; Putnam, 1977). The EU has
been characterized as the “the ultimate technocratic
project” (Leonard, 2011, p. 2) because of its large num-
ber of technocratic institutions (e.g., European Central
Bank, the European Court of Justice, other Independent
Regulatory Agencies).
2.1. Relating Populism and Technocracy: Commonalities
and Differences
Research has analyzed the commonalities and differ-
ences of populism and technocracy particularly in their
relationship to representative and party democracy
(Urbinati, 2014). By applying such a ‘relational perspec-
tive,’ both phenomena are perceived as symptoms of
a broader crisis of democratic legitimacy that share
“a unitary, nonpluralist, unmediated, and unaccountable
vision of society’s general interest” (Caramani, 2017,
p. 54) and have party democracy as their common ene-
my. Thus, the two phenomena are perceived as “mirror
images of each other” (Müller, 2014, p. 490). But there is
also a second—diametrically opposed—perception that
they are “two extreme poles of the continuum of poli-
tics” (Worsley, 1993, p. 730) because of the differences
in relation to central features of representation such as
legitimacy, political authority, and the role of the people.
From this perspective, technocracy and populism
seem incompatible. However, surprisingly, populism and
technocracy have rarely been directly connected. It is
argued in this article, that adopting a ‘unidirectional
perspective’ that looks at technocracy through populist
glasses is important to better understand the specific
relations between the two phenomena as well as the
phenomena themselves.
2.2. Adopting a Unidirectional Perspective: Populists’
Responses to the Technocratic Character of the EU
In order to analyze how populist parties position them-
selves in relation to technocracy, it has to be clari-
fied which dimensions are relevant from a theoretical
perspective. In line with the literature on technocracy
(Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2017; Caramani, 2017;
Urbinati, 2014), three central dimensions can be iden-
tified and used to derive potential responses to tech-
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nocracy: (1) the core ideas, (2) the modes, and (3) the
output of technocratic governance. These aspects can
be addressed by both critical and approving respons-
es. Before elaborating on these three dimensions, it
has to be stressed that due to the focus on tech-
nocracy and populism other populist responses to the
EU—pro-European and Eurosceptic positions—are not
in the scope of this article (see Section 3 for details).
Euroscepticism has been defined as the “idea of con-
tingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporat-
ing outright and unqualified opposition to the pro-
cess of European integration” (Taggart, 1998, p. 366).
The degree of opposition ranges from hard to soft
Euroscepticism and comprises critique from an econom-
ic, cultural, or political perspective (Hooghe & Marks,
2007; Taggart, 2004). Within this debate, technocratic
critique has been conceptualized as an element of the
political criticism of the EU. Research has revealed that—
in particular right-wing—populist parties in Europe are
often Eurosceptic (e.g., Harmsen, 2010; Pirro et al.,
2018). However, it has been stressed that populists are
not Eurosceptic per se (e.g., Kneuer, 2019). For instance,
Kaniok and Havlík (2016) show that ANO 2011—despite
being a populist party—has a pro-European attitude.
Hence, although Euroscepticism and technocratic cri-
tique of the EU overlap, they are neither conceptually
nor empirically congruent. Thus, conceptually, populist
responses to technocracy can refer to the following three
central dimensions.
First, responses to technocracy can refer to its core
idea of a unitary, common, and objective interest of a
given society. Technocratic governance implies the pres-
ence of technocratic elites, which identify the objective
interest based on expertise and “rational speculation”
(Caramani, 2017, p. 61). By refraining from mediation
and aggregation of different conflicting interests (e.g.,
by political parties), depoliticized, and rational solutions
to problems can be achieved. These central ideas can
be positively approved by populist parties or criticized.
Criticism could refer to a lack of input legitimacy due to
the unelected nature of technocratic elites and institu-
tions, as well as decisions which break the chain of del-
egation and lack popular sovereignty. Other arguments
could refer to a lack of responsibility and control and the
depoliticized nature of politics.
Second, building on these central ideas, respons-
es can also refer to the modes of technocratic gover-
nance. While bureaucracy is a constitutive element of all
forms of government, it is—together with regulation—
considered as of particular importance for a techno-
cratic way of governing (Esmark, 2020; Majone, 2007).
As Scicluna and Auer (2019) demonstrate, the monetary
crisis has made the EU government more technocratic
and increased the ‘regulatory space.’ This includes regu-
lations of policy areas by implementing regulatory stan-
dards through expertocratic and non-majoritarian reg-
ulatory bodies such as the European Central Bank or
the European Commission. Since the activities of tech-
nocratic elites are described as mostly non-transparent
(Radaelli, 1999, p. 155), responses are also expected
from this perspective. Although technocratic institutions
may appear to be less vulnerable to lobbying due to their
independence from the electoral process, the danger
of ‘corporate’ and ‘regulatory capture’ is nevertheless
part of the standard critique of technocratic institu-
tions (Majone, 1994, pp. 10, 21). These modes of gover-
nance can be evaluated positively as efficient and ratio-
nal forms of governance, or they may be criticized from
two perspectives: Either because of their lack of trans-
parency, or their overregulation.
A third dimension of responses refers to technocrat-
ic output and policy results which are ascribed to the
technocratic nature of decision-making. In relation to
the EU, it is assumed that responses refer in particular
to those policy areas which are increasingly tackled at
the European level such as monetary and fiscal policy,
economic policy, migration policy, austerity policy, and
consumer protection policy. Technocratic output is open
to criticism because it involves political decisions taken
by democratically illegitimate, unaccountable, and non-
transparent actors—or in other words, by technocratic
institutions. For instance, the austerity measures adopt-
ed by the Troika could be criticized both explicitly and
implicitly, for being legally binding but created without
democratic legitimacy, accountability, or transparency
(e.g., Barrett, Corbet, & Larkin, 2019).
How do populist parties respond to technocracy?
Do they criticize or approve of the technocratic nature
of the EU? And which aspects of technocracy do they
respond to? As argued, we expect a variety of populists’
responses. We assume that both dimensions, the pop-
ulist core and the host ideology (Akkerman, 2015; Huber
& Schimpf, 2017; Mudde, 2004), influence the responses
of the populist parties to technocracy.
2.2.1. Responses of Populist Parties Concerning the
Populist Core Element
Considering the characteristics and dimensions of tech-
nocracy, from the perspective of the populist core of the
parties, there are two ideal-typical responses to techno-
cratic political approaches.
The first response is a rejection of technocracy
because of the antagonism between populism and tech-
nocracy regarding their notion of the will of the peo-
ple, representation, legitimacy, and political authority
(Caramani, 2017). As such, it is linked to the idea that
populism “is a reaction against the growing technocrati-
zation of contemporary politics” (Bickerton & Invernizzi
Accetti, 2017, p. 336). Since technocracy is based on the
rule of legal, economic, technical, or scientific experts,
it resembles a clear violation of the expression of the
general will of the people. Thus, while populists identi-
fy the hegemonic unity of the true people as the ulti-
mate guideline of representation, the cutting of ties
between political decision-making and the people, as
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advocated by technocracy, represents a radical depar-
ture from this standard. As a consequence of the differ-
ent notion of representation, anti-technocratic populists
criticize a clear lack of input legitimacy present in tech-
nocratic governance. The same should be true for polit-
ical authority, which in anti-technocratic populist terms
legitimately only can be derived from the will of the ‘true
people’ and in turn explicitly cannot be legitimized on the
basis of rational, impartial, and correct decisions gener-
ated by distant technocratic institutions.
In contrast to this first ideal-type reaction, a second
potential response is a positive assessment of technoc-
racy by combining populist and technocratic elements
(Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2017; Buštíková & Guasti,
2019; de la Torre, 2013) based on the described common-
alities of a unitary conception and unmediated interest
of society. As such, it uses the pretext of technocratic
expertise to rule in the nameof the people (Müller, 2016).
Such a response might also rely on the shared criticism
of populism and technocracy against the current ruling
political elite as well as party democracy. In contrast to
the first response, it is assumed that this response does
not refer to a lack of input legitimacy but rather stresses
the role of the output legitimacy that could be reached if
the current political elite were replaced with technocrats
to transform the general will of the true people.
Since the unidirectional perspective reveals more
differences than commonalities between populism and
technocracy, we expect that populist parties are more
likely to reject technocracy than approve it. The second
response is thus expected to be rather an exceptional
case. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 reads as follows:
H1: Populist parties are more likely to criticize the
technocratic nature of the EU than approve of it.
2.2.2. Responses of Populist Parties Concerning the Role
of the Host Ideology
Second, we expect considerable variation in the respons-
es to technocracy depending on the attitudes that con-
stitute the respective host ideologies (Akkerman, 2015;
Katsambekis, 2017). In particular, we assume that the
responses of the left-wing and right-wing populist par-
ties to the modes of technocratic governance and the
technocratic output will differ. Since left and right con-
ceptions of politics vary considerably in terms of the size
of the state and the extent of regulations that can aim
at virtually all aspects of public life (Budge, 2013; Sartori,
1976/2005), it is to be expected that left-wing populists
are open to regulation and bureaucracy. Research shows
that right-wing populists are more heterogeneous: while
neo-liberal populists are generally opposed to govern-
ment intervention (Betz, 1993), radical right-wing pop-
ulists are not necessarily opposed to these interventions
(Otjes, Ivaldi, Jupskås, & Mazzoleni, 2018). Nevertheless,
we assume that averagely left-wing populist parties are
less critical to regulation and bureaucracy than right-
wing populist parties. Research on Euroscepticism has
revealed (e.g., Pirro et al., 2018; Pirro & van Kessel, 2017)
that left-wing populist parties criticize the EU for its
‘neoliberal’ agenda and the austerity measures imposed
by EU institutions, and their negative economic and
social consequences. Accordingly, it is assumed that the
response to technocracy is also particularly related to
issues such as austerity policy and economic policies.
In contrast, as a result of nativism being their core ide-
ological element (Mudde, 2007), right-wing populist par-
ties are assumed to perceive the EU as a threat to cul-
tural homogeneity and national sovereignty (Pirro et al.,
2018). In line with this, we assume that right-wing pop-
ulist parties respond to technocracy particularly in rela-
tion to policy issues of migration, and border protection.
Assumptions about hybrid populists who reject placing
themselves on the ideological left-right spectrum are by
contrast hard to formulate. Due to their chameleon-like
nature, they are expected to show characteristics of both
classic left- and right-wing populist actors. Due to the pos-
itive evaluation of technocracy, technocratic populists
are expected to not criticize modes of governance and
policy results as a result of the technocratic nature of the
EU. Therefore, the Hypotheses 2a–2c read as follows:
H2a: Left-wing populist parties are less likely to
criticize regulation and bureaucracy as technocratic
modes of governance than other populist parties.
H2b: Right-wing populist parties are more likely to crit-
icize policy results which are ascribed to the techno-
cratic nature of decision-making in fields related to
cultural issues. In contrast, left-wing populist parties
are more likely to criticize policy results related to eco-
nomic issues.
H2c: Technocratic populist parties are less likely to
criticize technocratic modes of governance and pol-
icy results in relation to the technocratic nature of
decision-making.
3. Methods, Case Description and Data
The empirical analysis is based on the party manifestos
for the European election, 2019. The ninth election of
the European Parliament took place on 23–26 May 2019,
with the election campaign being dominated by econom-
ic issues such as economic growth and the fight against
unemployment (Eurobarometer, 2019). While the impor-
tance of migration policy issues appears to have dimin-
ished, growing importance was attached to the issue of
climate protection. According to a tally by Ivaldi (2020,
pp. 77–78), in the 2019 European Parliament elections
right-wing populist parties campaigned in 20 countries,
left-wing populist (left-wing populist) parties in 12 coun-
tries, and hybrid populist parties in nine countries which
also comprises the type of technocratic populist party
(see also Rooduijn et al., 2020; Zulianello, 2020).
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In order to analyze whether there are systematic dif-
ferences between these types of populist parties, we sys-
tematically selected 12 cases based on two main crite-
ria: First, we selected for each type four parties, which
were assigned to the same type in both Zulianello’s
(2020) and Ivaldi’s (2020) classifications. Second, these
parties had to cover Western Europe, Southern Europe,
as well as Central and Eastern Europe. Based on these
criteria, the following cases were included in the sam-
ple: DIE LINKE (Germany, left-wing populist), Podemos
(Spain, left-wing populist), Syriza (Greece, left-wing pop-
ulist), Levica (Slovenia, left-wing populist), M5S (Italy,
hybrid populist), ANO 2011 (Czech Republic, hybrid pop-
ulist), OL’aNO (Slovakia, hybrid populist), GERB (Bulgaria,
hybrid populist), AfD (Germany, right-wing populist), RN
(France, right-wing populist), Vox (Spain, right-wing pop-
ulist), and Jobbik (Hungary, right-wing populist). Since
there is no hybrid populist party in Western Europe
and only one in Southern Europe (M5S; see Zulianello,
2020), three hybrid populist parties are included from
Central and Eastern Europe (ANO 2011, OL’aNO, GERB).
ANO 2011 has also been characterized as a technocrat-
ic populist party. The selected cases include government
(e.g., ANO 2011) and opposition parties (e.g., AfD). This
might be of relevance as governing parties can be expect-
ed to be less Eurosceptic since they are at least partial-
ly responsible for staff and content of European policy.
Moreover, the selected parties vary regarding their posi-
tion to the EU, from hard Euroscepticism (e.g., RN) to
pro-European (e.g., GERB), which allows for better dis-
entanglement of the relationship between technocracy,
populism, and Euroscepticism.
Election manifestos are appropriate documents since
they are “the only authoritative collective statement”
(Hansen, 2008, p. 203) of parties and thus show what
a party stands for at a certain point of time. They allow
for cross-national studies and have been used widely
to study populist parties (e.g., Manucci & Weber, 2017;
Rooduijn, de Lange, & van der Brug, 2014). The mani-
festos were analyzed through a qualitative and quantita-
tive content analysis (Mayring, 2015). The deductive con-
tent analysis is based on the central categories elaborat-
ed in Section 2.2 (see Table 1). For the qualitative analy-
sis, it is combined with inductive logics (see Table 2). This
is the most common way to measure the manifestos of
populist parties (Rooduijn et al., 2014). The unit of mea-
surement is the sentence. The scores in Table 1 represent
the percentages of words for the different categories of
each manifesto. Each sentence has only been assigned to
one category. If a sentence contains messages of two or
more categories, the sentence was assigned to the most
dominant message.
During the process of coding, it was important to
separate criticism of technocracy from other forms of
Euroscepticism. Theoretically, statements can connect
Euroscepticism and criticism of technocracy in three dif-
ferent combinations: A statement can be (1) Eurosceptic
but not critical of technocracy, (2) Eurosceptic and crit-
ical of technocracy, and (3) non-Eurosceptic and critical
of technocracy. While the second and third combination
are relevant, the first combination is not part of the analy-
sis since it is not related to technocracy. Examples are
critical statements about the federation principle, viola-
tions of the subsidiarity principle or doubting the com-
petence of a member state. The option (2) combines
a Eurosceptic with a technocratic-critical message and
thus cannot be entirely disentangled. An example is the
following statement by the AfD:
Due to a lack of a close relationship with the citi-
zens, the intransparency of the EU institutions, their
far-reaching regulatory power and their decisions on
enormous financial resources, a machinery of rep-
resentatives involving more than 25,000 lobbyists
established in the control centers of the EU. (AfD,
2019b, p. 13)
It combines a Eurosceptic (general democratic deficit)
stance with a distinctly technocratic-critical perspective.
An example of the third combination is when a party
has a pro-European stance but criticizes the technocratic
mode of governance.
Concerning the evaluation of the technocratic nature
of the EU (see Table 2), it was coded ‘0’ if there was no
statement in the manifesto. A relevant statement which
criticized technocracy was labelled with a ‘–‘ (e.g., a call
for “debureaucratization”; DIE LINKE, 2019, p. 28). If the
intensity and tonality of the criticism were extreme, the
code ‘– –’ was assigned (e.g., demands for a “shrinkage of
the inflated bureaucratic apparatus”; AfD, 2019b, p. 12).
The same principle was applied for positive responses
to technocracy. To assess inter-coder reliability, all man-
ifestos were coded by both authors. The percentage
agreement and Cohen’s Kappa are almost perfectly con-
sistent (Landis & Koch, 1977).
4. Empirical Evidence
As a first step of the data analysis, we analyze whether
and to which extent the different populist parties
respond to the technocratic nature of the EU in the elec-
toral manifestos (Table 1). Notably, every election mani-
festo contains elements of responses to technocratic gov-
ernance, though the share varies considerably between
0.2% and 27.2%. In particular, the manifestos of M5S
(22.6%) and RN (27.2%) contain very high levels of reac-
tions to the technocratic governance of the EU. For the
other parties, with an average value of 5.7% and a range
between 0.2% and 7.5%, technocratic responses are
less dominant. Nevertheless, this share of technocracy-
related messages is of a similar level as the share of
populist messages of populist parties in their manifestos:
For example, the study of Rooduijn et al. (2014) reveals
that an average of 7.4% of the paragraphs of the election
manifestos of populist parties contained populist mes-
sages (ranging between 1.0% and 23.1%). This points to
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Table 1. Share of populist parties’ responses to the technocratic nature of the EU.
Type of
Populist Party Left-Wing Populist Hybrid Populist Right-Wing Populist
Response to
DimensionTechnocratic DIE LINKE Podemos Syriza Levica M5S ANO 2011 OL´aNO GERB AfD RN Vox JobbikGovernance of GERMANY SPAIN GREECE SLOVENIA ITALY CZECH REPUBL. SLOVAKIA BULGARIA GERMANY FRANCE SPAIN HUNGARY
the EU
Core Features Input Legitimacy 1.33% 0.66% — 1.14% — — — — 0.84% 3.16% 0.49% —
Control and 0.26% 0.81% — 0.39% — — — — 0.17% 4.91% — 1.17%
Accountability
Representation 0.22% 0.46% — — 4.0% — — — — 2.4% — —
Elites — 0.77% 4.15% — — — — — — 3.91% 2.96% 0.58%




Regulation — 0.07% — — 7.62% 2.8% — — 1.21% 2.53% 0.87% —
Bureaucracy 0.13% 0.53% — — 3.81% 1.0% 5.43% 0.22% 1.81% 2.96% 0.12% 1.29%
Transparency 0.44% 1.4% — 0.63% — — 3.18% — 0.8% — — 1.37%
Role of Corporate & 0.97% 1.22% — 0.81% — — — — 0.57% 1.82% 0.25% —
Interest Groups
Responses to Modes 1.54% 3.22% 0.0% 1.44% 11.43% 3.8% 8.61% 0.22% 4.39% 7.31% 1.24% 2.66%
of Governances
Output Economic 1.81% 0.92% 3.18% 0.86% 7.14% — — — 1.16% 4.6% 0.44% 1.71%
Cultural — — — — — — — — 0.23% 0.93% — —
Other 0.52% 0.2% — — — — — — 0.74% — 0.84% —
Responses to 2.33% 1.12% 3.18% 0.86% 7.14% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.13% 5.53% 1.28% 1.71%
Technocratic Output
Responses to 5.6% 7.0% 7.3% 3.8% 22.6% 3.8% 8.6% 0.22% 7.5% 27.2% 7.1% 6.11%
Technocracy
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Table 2. Evaluation of the technocratic nature of the EU by populist parties.
Type of
Populist Party Left-Wing Populist Hybrid Populist Right-Wing Populist
Response to
DimensionTechnocratic DIE LINKE Podemos Syriza Levica M5S ANO 2011 OL´aNO GERB AfD RN Vox JobbikGovernance of GERMANY SPAIN GREECE SLOVENIA ITALY CZECH REPUBLIC SLOVAKIA BULGARIA GERMANY FRANCE SPAIN HUNGARY
the EU
Core Features Input Legitimacy – – – – 0 – – 0 0 0 0 – – – – – 0
Control and – – – 0 – 0 0 0 0 – – 0 –
Accountability
Representation – – – 0 0 – 0 0 0 0 – – 0 0
Elites 0 – – – – 0 0 0 0 0 0 – – – – –
∑ – – – – – – 0 0 0 – – – – –
Modes of
Governance
Regulation 0 – 0 0 ++ – 0 0 – – – – – – 0
Bureaucracy – – 0 0 – – – – – – – – – – –
Transparency – – – – 0 – 0 0 – 0 – 0 0 –
Role of Corporate & – – – – 0 – 0 0 0 0 – – – 0
Interest Groups
∑ – – – – 0 – +&– – 0 – – – – – – –
Output Economic – – – – – – – – 0 0 0 – – – – –
Cultural 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 – – 0 0
Other – – 0 0 0 0 0 0 – 0 – 0
∑ – – – – – 0 0 0 – – – –
Notes: ++ = very positive; + = positive; 0 = no reference; – = negative; – – = very negative.
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a high importance of populists’ responses to the techno-
cratic nature of the EU. The analyses of the parties’ posi-
tions to the core ideas of technocratic governance reveal
a clear pattern regarding the types of populist parties:
All examined left- and right-wing populist parties criti-
cize central core features of technocratic government.
In contrast, among the hybrid populist parties, this is only
true for the Italian M5S, while ANO 2011, OL’aNO, and
GERB neither criticize a lack of input legitimacy, missing
accountability, nor the existence of technocratic elites.
Overall, one-half of the parties examined criticize the lack
of input legitimacy and thus the insufficient integration
of the ‘general will of the people’ due to the technocrat-
ic nature of EU governance. The AfD (2019b, p. 7), for
example, states “that,without the consent of the citizens,
an artificial state far removed from the citizens is being
created.” Similarly, the RN (2019, pp. 4, 17) declares that
“the power should be given back to the people by abolish-
ing the European Commission” since the 28 commission-
ers “were not chosen democratically.” Yet, this kind of
criticism is not exclusive to right-wing populists; left-wing
populist parties such as Podemos (2019, p. 9) also crit-
icize a “breach of legitimacy” and admonish that the
“EU Parliament is inferior to bodies with little democrat-
ic legitimacy such as the Council and the Commission.”
DIE LINKE (2019, pp. 8, 27) points to the “undemocratic
orientation of the European Central Bank and the Troika.”
In the same way, the Slovenian Levica (2019, p. 13) finds
fault with “the unelected technocrats [who] have no
right to write our future.” Moreover, six parties also see
a lack of democratic control and accountability due to
technocracy. In their view, the “technocratic bodies [are]
beyond” (Levica, 2019, p. 9) or “far removed” (Podemos,
2019, p. 9) fromany principle of democratic controlwhile
this important aspect in the context of EU governance is
generally “totally inadequate” (AfD, 2019b, p. 11).
In addition, five parties stress the technocratic nature
of the elites and thus combine the populist core element
of anti-elitism with criticism of technocracy. Similar to
Syriza and Vox, the RN’s election manifesto repeatedly
mentions so-called Eurocrats, i.e., a combination of the
words ‘Europe’ and ‘technocrats’/‘bureaucrats.’ In prin-
ciple, the term contains three dimensions of populist
criticism: In addition to a Eurosceptic attitude, the term
also rejects the technocratic style of government, and
finally criticizes a particular elite, namely the ‘Eurocrats.’
Similarly, Jobbik (2019, p. 5) states that “[t]he bureau-
cratic elite of the EU does nothing to solve our com-
mon European problems.” The word ‘technocracy’ itself
appears verbatim with a negative connotation in the
manifestos of AfD, Levica, OL’aNO, Podemos, and RN.
Referring to both quantity and quality of critique, these
five parties give significantly more weight to technocratic
critique compared to the others, in particular Syriza and
M5S, which criticize only one or few core elements of
technocracy. Despite these quantitative differences, all
these populist parties share the view that technocracy
is in clear opposition to the idea of the general will of
the people. As mentioned above, the parties ANO 2011,
OL’aNO and GERB clearly deviate from the technocratic
critique of the right- and left-wing populist parties since
no single element of criticism to the core features of tech-
nocratic governance can be found in their European elec-
tion manifestos. In sum, based on the observed cases,
being against the technocratic nature of the EU seems
to be the default position of left- and right-wing pop-
ulist parties. Since, numerically speaking, 75% (or 9 out
of 12) of the parties investigated respond negatively to
the core features of technocratic governance, there is
evidence for the first hypothesis. However, the results
for the three hybrid populist parties from Central and
Eastern Europe, OL’aNO, GERB, and ANO 2011, clear-
ly deviate due to their neutral or even positive stance
towards technocracy. This corresponds with the findings
of Buštíková and Guasti (2019) and Havlík (2019) which
classified ANO 2011 as a technocratic populist party.
All examined populist parties—independent of their
host ideology—criticize modes of technocratic gover-
nance. However, patterns, extent, as well as the political
style of the messages differ substantially. The right-wing
populist parties are significantly more critical towards
regulation and—to a lesser extent—towards bureaucra-
cy of the EU than left-wing populist parties. For instance,
RN (2019, p. 5) blames the European Commission for
an “irresponsible inflation of rules, constraints, and stan-
dards,” and Vox (2019, p. 22) asserts that “European
over-regulation and bureaucracy have ended up dyna-
miting innovative projects.” The AfD (2019b, pp. 43, 11)
refers to an “excessive bureaucracy” and demonizes a
“European frenzy of regulation.” Moreover, Jobbik (p. 7)
criticizes the “unshakable bloc of power represented by
the bureaucracy of the EU.” Although left-wing-populist
parties also criticize modes of technocratic governance,
they do it to a lesser extent and also less aggressively.
For instance, DIE LINKE (2019, p. 28) states that the par-
ty “advocates debureaucratization.” These differences in
the extent and tonality of criticism can presumably be
explained by their respective host ideologies. Another
striking observation is that all four hybrid populist par-
ties studied criticize aspects of bureaucracy. An exam-
ple of this observation is the Slovakian party OL’aNO,
which advocates a “substantial reduction of bureaucra-
cy” (OL’aNO, 2019, p. 2). With regard to transparency and
the danger of “interest group capture,” no substantial dif-
ferences can be identified between left and right-wing
populists. However, it is interesting to note that—with
the exception ofOL’aNO—thehybrid or technocratic pop-
ulists do not criticize these dimensions. With regard to
transparency, the cases of ANO 2011 and GERB also tell
a similar story. Overall, there is some evidence for H2a,
even though the differences in terms of bureaucracy and
regulation between left-wing and right-wing populist par-
ties are rather marginal.
With regard to policy output, the analysis reveals that
right-wing populist parties criticize particularly the tech-
nocratic nature and output in the field of monetary and
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currency policy (banking union, Euro-ethics). For exam-
ple, the AfD (2019b, p. 8) condemns the “banking union
with the communitarization of unlimited liabilities and
assistance.” Left-wing populist criticism is instead direct-
ed in particular at problems that arise in the field of
austerity and neoliberal economic policy. For instance,
DIE LINKE (2019, p. 25) states that “the European Crisis
policy of the Troika…under the leadership of the German
government has plunged millions into misery.” In a simi-
lar vein, Levica (2019, p. 12) states that “restricting demo-
cratic decision-making with the aim of imposing neolib-
eral policies is a key reason for the spread of anger, frus-
tration and hopelessness across Europe, which encour-
ages the growth of the far right.” Criticism of particu-
lar policy output is often accompanied by a criticism
of technocratic elites. For example, Syriza (2019, p. 3)
argues, in the context of austerity policy, “that the rul-
ing European elite wanted to teach the Greeks a les-
son.” Overall, the qualitative analysis reveals that criti-
cism in relation to policy output is—in contrast to the
other two dimensions—hardly explicit but in most cas-
es only implicitly linked to technocracy in the manifestos,
for instance by referring to the technocratic institutions,
modes of governance, or the “bureaucratic elite” (Jobbik,
2019, p. 5). On the one side, it could be argued that
these statements are rather examples of Euroscepticism
and anti-elitism but not for technocracy-related critique.
But on the other side, it could also be argued that the
output is also criticized because political decisions have
been taken by technocratic institutions which are per-
ceived as undemocratic actors. Hence, there is some evi-
dence for criticism of policy output, which is indirectly
ascribed to the technocratic nature of decision-making.
However, both left- and right-wing populist parties link
this predominantly to economic policies. While right-
wing populist parties focus on monetary and fiscal pol-
icy, those on the left-wing refer to austerity policies.
Criticisms of the EU for cultural reasons, in particular
in the fields of immigration policy and border protec-
tion, are important statements in the manifestos of the
(right-wing) populist parties. However, interestingly, crit-
icism in these policy fields is not linked to technocracy.
Therefore, H2b has to be rejected. In contrast, H2c is
confirmed since ANO 2011 and GERB as the two tech-
nocratic populist parties in the sample criticize neither
the modes of technocratic governance nor policy results
in relation to the technocratic nature of decision-making
(ANO 2011, 2019; GERB, 2019).
5. Conclusion
The central research question has been how populist
parties react to technocracy in general and to the tech-
nocratic nature of the EU in particular. In contrast to
the relational perceptive in the existing literature, we
have argued that a unidirectional perspective is required
to unbox the relation between populism and technoc-
racy. The quantitative and qualitative analyses of the
European election manifestos of 12 populist parties show
that the default stance of European left- and right-wing
populist parties is anti-technocratic. As such, it is not the
commonalities between populism and technocracy, such
as a unitary, non-pluralist, and unmediated approach of
politics (Caramani, 2017) that are relevant for populist
responses to technocracy. Instead, as a general rule, left-
and right-wing populist parties criticize the core elements
of technocracy because of the antagonism between pop-
ulism and technocracy regarding their notion of the will
of the people, representation, and legitimacy. In partic-
ular, technocracy is criticized because it cuts the ties
between political decision-making and the people.
With regard to the category of hybrid populist
parties, the picture is more complex. ANO 2011 and
GERB are populist parties which do not have a criti-
cal stance towards technocracy. This result underlines
the existing analyses by Buštíková and Guasti (2019)
and Havlík (2019) who classified ANO 2011 as a tech-
nocratic populist party. Our results likewise give reason
to interpret technocratic populism as a distinct type of
populism that is significantly different from left- and
right-wing, but at the same time from other hybrid
forms of populism. To put it another way: ANO 2011
and GERB should therefore be classified as technocrat-
ic populist parties. In contrast, there are two hybrid
populist parties in our sample, M5S and OL’aNO, which
can—if at all—only partially be classified as technocrat-
ic populist. Although both parties are modest (M5S) in
their criticism regarding the core features and the out-
put of technocratic governance, or even entirely refrain
from it (OL’aNO), the manifestos nevertheless clear-
ly contain anti-technocratic stances: M5S (2019, p. 1)
demands “more power for citizens’ representatives, less
for bureaucrats” while OL’aNO (2019, p. 2) states that
“[t]he technocratic mentality that prevails in Brussels,
Strasbourg and Luxembourg is leading to an increase
in the sense of distance between European officials
and those they are meant to serve—European citizens.”
Accordingly, the results for OL’aNO are conceptually and
empirically highly relevant for this article: the Slovakian
party is not considered to be Eurosceptic (Rooduijn et al.,
2020) but criticizes the technocratic nature of EU gov-
ernance. Consequently, non-Eurosceptic populist parties
can indeed be anti-technocratic. This supports our argu-
ment that Euroscepticism and technocratic criticism are
distinct phenomena, even though they may overlap.
In addition, our analyses have shown that the tech-
nocratic critique differs with regard to the respective
host ideology of the populist parties: Right-wing pop-
ulist parties tend to criticize bureaucracy and regula-
tion as modes of technocratic governance more harsh-
ly than left-wing populists which is in line with the gen-
eral stances of their host ideologies. There is also some
evidence for criticism of policy output which is ascribed
to the technocratic nature of decision-making, but this is
less explicitly articulated in the manifestos. In contrast
to the results of the existing literature which suggests
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that left-wing populist parties tend to criticize the EU for
economic reasons, whereas the right-wing do so for cul-
tural reasons (Otjes et al., 2018; Pirro et al., 2018), our
analyses identify technocratic critique from both types
of populist parties predominantly in relation to economic
policies. While right-wing populist parties focus onmone-
tary and fiscal policy, left-wing populist parties more fre-
quently refer to austerity policies. Criticisms of the EU
for cultural reasons, in particular in the fields of immigra-
tion policy and border protection, are an important part
of the manifestos, in particular of the right-wing populist
parties. However, it is interesting to note that criticisms
in these policy fields are not linked to technocracy.
Overall, this study has shown that the relation
between populism and technocracy is also crucial to
be able to understand the phenomena themselves.
However, further analyses are needed to improve our
understanding of their relationship. It is assumed that
the responses of populist parties to technocracy at the
level of the EU are partly linked to a general Eurosceptic
stance of these parties. This makes it difficult to disentan-
gle criticism of the technocratic nature of the EU from
other forms of Euroscepticism. Moreover, it is possible
that populist parties may criticize or reject the techno-
cratic nature of European institutions simply for strategic
reasons (Weyland, 2017). For example, it is conceivable
that the EU per se could be portrayed as a scapegoat
and that the supranational level, in general, might be
used as a sort of lightning rod. In this respect, the rejec-
tion of technocratic EU institutions would be based on
strategic motives, while populist actors might not have
substantive problems with technocratic solutions. These
aspects make it difficult to entirely disentangle the com-
plex relationship between populism, technocracy, and
Euroscepticism. Therefore, further studies should investi-
gate the national level in European countries but also oth-
er regions. Another aspect of relevance is the distinction
between government and opposition populist parties.
Since ANO 2011 and GERB make up the governments
of their countries, future research needs to address the
question of whether there is a causal link between a lack
of technocratic critique and the takeover of government
offices. In addition, future studies should also include
non-populist parties and their attitudes towards techno-
cratic solutions and compare them with those of populist
parties. This would allow the analysis of whether criti-
cism of technocracy is stronger among populist parties
than among other parties and thus if populism drives crit-
icism of technocracy.
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